Showing posts with label spear-phishing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label spear-phishing. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 4, 2018

A cyber-attack on ideas: Mabna behind latest frightening global phising campaign that targets intellectual property, with allegations of state-sponsorship.

An indictment for nine Iranians was unsealed on March 23 2018. They each stand accused of a variety of crimes relating to cyber-attacks conducted on universities, government agencies, and private organisations around the globe. 31 terabytes of data was stolen - that is a lot of data! The nine suspects are all affiliated with Mabna, the group responsible for the HBO hacking (in which Game of Thrones episodes were leaked), which led to the indictment of Mesri for his involvement in the hacking and attempts to extort US$6 million. It has been revealed that the cyber-assault used customized phishing emails that were sent under the disguise of academics at other institutions. The emails contained links to academic papers that directed the victim to a malicious domain masquerading as a university web page, prompting the victim to give away his log-in details.

Among the victims were government agencies and private companies, but the primary target was universities, with around 8000 professors falling victims. So, unlike the targets identified in previous indictments, we now appear to be seeing a diversification of the type and location of the target. Furthermore, the attack was indiscriminate with regards to academic discipline. Whilst the economic value of the data should not be given disregarded (the indictment makes the cost of the stolen research to USE institutions as US$3.4 billion), the financial loss is only one implication. The concept of targeting innovation, ideas and information, acquired through years of research effort, is new and frightening. The attacks demonstrate the need for academic institutions, to improve their cyber-security, both in terms of the awareness and implementation. It is worrying that the attacks reached beyond the usual suspects of the US and Israel; universities in 22 different counties, including many in Europe, and also China, were victims. Among the non-academic targets was the Unite Nations Children's Fund, demonstrating the callous and indiscriminate way in which the Iranian cyber machine selects victims.

Whilst considered innocent until proven guilty in a court of law, presumably investigators must be pretty convinced of guilt to name these individuals in the indictment. These men will join those previously indicted by the FBI for cyber-criminals, in not being able to leave Iran without fear of arrest. This limitation of freedom will surely deter some of those considering a 'career' in hacking, and slow recruitment to the Iranian cyber-army.

Who is backing Mabna? The indictment reveals that spear-phising email attacks were then conducted on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran. But were there other governmental bodies involved? This is a persistent question which resurfaces with each attack. Given their close association, it seems likely that there is some level of co-ordination between the IRGC and other government offices, like those within the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when planning the cyber-attacks. Will this public condemnation deter Iran form undertaking further attacks on university, or will the stat simply distance themselves form cyber criminals?

Tuesday, January 2, 2018

Iranian hackers join Chinese in the use of fake social media profiles:

In December, reports were published that the German intelligence services have uncovered use of fake social media profiles by Chinese intelligence. However, it is not just the Chinese that use this type of deception; Clearsky have reported that Iranian cyber criminals are doing the same

The report provides evidence demonstrating that the Iranian cyber group Charming Kitten have created LinkedIn company pages and profiles for a fake news-agency called 'British News', in an attempt to authenticate their British News website, which has been set up to infect targeted visitors. The hacking group also used false Facebook and Twitter profiles to 'verify' fake personas when emailing targets. These more innovative methods were being used alongside more 'well-known' techniques, such as spear phishing.


The LinkedIn sign-in page is displayed on an Apple iPad Air in an arranged photograph in Hong Kong, China, on Feb. 25, 2014.

Monday, October 2, 2017

Iranian Hacking Threat to USA if Nuclear Deal Collapses



Since the signing of the nuclear deal between the USA and Iran in 2015 (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)), Iranian cyber attacks against the USA have dropped off. 

The U.S. and six partners began discussions with Iran in 2013 to lift some economic sanctions to limit Iranian nuclear developments, and since then Iranian hackers have largely reduced attacks against the U.S., focusing instead on industrial espionage and hitting rival Middle Eastern countries. However, with the threat by the U.S. President Donald Trump to walk away from the deal, there are fears that Iran will re-start cyber-attacks against the USA.

The cyber-security research company FireEye have produced a report which has identified an Iranian-government group that FireEye have called APT33 (APT means Advanced Persistent Threat, indicating state-involvement). APT33 has previously attacked using spear-phishing techniques to target companies involved in the petrochemical industry and in military and commercial aviation. Could APT33 or similar be ready to attack the U.S. if Trump quits the JCPOA?

A Short History of Iranian Cyber-attacks

  • 2010: It was suspected that the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran with the Stuxnet malware, damaging Iranian nuclear control equipment at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant.
  • 2011/2013: In possible response to Stuxnet, Iran used DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) Operation Ababil attacks against over 45 major financial institutions. Seven members of the Iranian ITSec Team were subsequently indicted by the FBI for over 176 days of DDoS attacks against the U.S. and also the attack against the Bowman Dam.
  • 2012: APT33 attack the Saudi Aramco oil company using the Shamoon malware, destroying thousands of computers in that company.
  • 2015: After JCPOA, large-scale Iranian attacks against the U.S. dropped off, although this may also have been due to Iran's concerns with Syria and Yemen. Also, APT33 continued espionage attacks against the U.S., South Korea and Saudi. In 2015, many Iranian hacking forums and use of hacker handles disappeared, probably because Iran realized that they were under greater scrutiny. 
  • 2016/2017: APT33 attacked Saudi and U.S. aerospace companies, along with attacks against a South Korean petrochemical company. In May 2017, APT33 attacked a Saudi organization and a South Korean company using malicious spear-phishing emails attempting to target victims with job vacancies for a Saudi petrochemical company.

The FireEye APT33 Report

FireEye state that APT33 used an Iranian developed web-shell developed by the hacker Solevisibile to craft the spear-phishing emails to targets. The webshell (called ALFASHELL, ALFA TEaM Shell v2-Fake Mail), has the default sender email address of solevisible@gmail.com. It is not known if Solevisible is linked with APT33 or not.

APT33 used domain masquerading as the following companies: Boeing, Alsalam Aircraft Company, Northrop Grumman Aviation Arabia, and Vinnell Arabia. APT33 used the domains to target victims with spear-phishing emails.

FireEye identified the hacker xman_1365_x as being the developer of a backdoor used in APT33 malware. It appears that xman_1365_x was also a manager in the Barnamenevis Iranian programming & software engineering forum, and registered accounts in the Iranian Shabgard and Ashiyane forums. The hacker xman_1365_x is also linked with the Nasr Institute, which is similar to Iran’s cyber army and controlled by the Iranian government. The Nasr Institute appears to be linked to the 2011-2013 DDoS attacks on the financial industry (Operation Ababil).

Further indications that Iran is behind APT33

  • A malware dropper (known as StoneDrill) used by APT33 has Farsi language artifacts in it.
  • APT33’s targeting of organizations involved in aerospace and energy is aligned with with nation-state interests (not those of cyber-criminal groups), implying that APT33 is probably government sponsored.
  • Iranian working hours; APT33 worked at the time zone close to 04:30 hours ahead of UTC, which heavily indicates Iran. APT33 largely operated on days that correspond to the Iranian working week (Saturday to Wednesday). Iran is one of few countries that subscribes to a Saturday to Wednesday working week.
  • APT33 used popular Iranian hacker tools and DNS servers used by other suspected Iranian hackers. The publicly available backdoors & tools utilized by APT33 (including NANOCORE, NETWIRE, and ALFA Shell) are available on Iranian hacking websites, associated with Iranian hackers, and used by other suspected Iranian threat groups.

Wednesday, November 25, 2015

Iranian Hackers Attack State Dept. via Social Media Accounts


Iran launched sophisticated computer espionages leading to a series of cyberattacks against US State Department officials over the past month.

It is possible that cyberespionage is becoming the tool of seeking the type of influence that Iranian hardliners hoped that that country's nuclear program will eventually provide.

According to diplomatic and law enforcement officials who are familiar with the investigation Iranian hackers over the past month identified individual State Department officials who focus on Iran and the Middle East and broke into their email and social media accounts. The State Department became aware of the compromises when Facebook told the victims that the state-sponsored hackers compromised their accounts.

Iran’s cyberskills are not yet equal to those of Russia or China but the attack against the State Department by using the social media accounts of young government employees to gain access to their friends across the administration is a focus that was not seen before.

Iranians have been less destructive than they could be, but they are getting far more aggressive in cyberespionage, which they know is less likely it will prompt a response from the United States.

Iranian hackers have been responsible for a series of powerful attacks against American banks that took their websites offline as well as a destructive attack on Saudi Aramco, the world’s largest oil producer, that replaced data on employee machines with an image of a burning American flag. American government officials also blame Iran for a similarly destructive attack at RasGas, the Qatari natural gas giant,and for an attack on Sands Casino in Las Vegas, where a large number of computers were destroyed.

Last year Iranians began using cyberattacks for espionage rather than for destruction and disruption. From May 2014 Iranian hackers were targeting Iranian dissidents and later policy makers,senior military personnel and defense contractors in the United States, England and Israel.

The attacks were basic “spear phishing” attempts, in which attackers tried to lure their victims to click on a malicious link, in this case by impersonating members of the news media.
Iranian hackers were successful in more than a quarter of their attempts. The number of such attacks reached its climax in May just ahead of the nuclear talks in Vienna in July and reached more than 1,500 attempts.

In the months before the talks, Iran’s hackers began probing critical infrastructure networks in what appeared reconnaissance for cyberattacks with the objective of causing physical damage but in June and July as American and Iranian negotiators gathered in Vienna to agree a deal on Iran’s nuclear program, attacks against targets in the United States stopped. Instead of this, Iran started targeting victims in Israel as well as members of Daesh in July as the militant group began expanding territory across Iraq.

Then in August just two weeks after the nuclear accord was reached, the trickle of cyberattacks against the group’s usual targets resumed against included 1600 individuals from scholars, scientists, chief executives and ministry officials to education institutes, journalists and human rights activists. If facebook last month had not decided to use a new alert system to notify users when facebook's security team believed state-sponsored hackers had hijacked their accounts, and US State Department officials began to see a troubling new message pop up on their facebook accounts, it is possible that the victims didn't learn of the compromises.

Friday, May 30, 2014

NEWSCASTER: Iran Attacks Social Media


Iranian state targeted the public and private sector in the US, Israel, UK and beyond using social media.

Iranian hackers use more than ten fake identities on social networking sites (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Google+, YouTube, Blogger) in a coordinated long-term cyber espionage campaign.  At least 2,000 people are caught in the snare and are connected to the false identities.

This campaign is working undetected since 2011 and targets senior American military and diplomatic personnel, congressional personnel, Washington DC journalists, US think tanks, defense contractors in the US and Israel, and others who are loud supporters of Israel to covertly obtain log-in credentials to the email systems of these victims. They targeted also additional victims in the UK as well as Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

The targeting, operational schedule and infrastructure used in this campaign is consistent with Iranian origins.
The fake identities claim they work in journalism, government and defense contracting. These accounts are elaborate and create credibility using among other tactics a fictitious journalism website newsonair.org that copies news content from other media outlets.

These credible identities then connected, linked, followed and friended target victims to get access to information on location, activities and relationships from updates and other common content.

These identities then targeted accounts with spear-phishing messages. Links which appeared to be legitimate asked recipients to log in to false pages to capture credential information. It is not clear at this time how many credentials the attack captured so far.

Additionally this campaign is linked to malware. While the malware is not very sophisticated, but it includes capability that can be used for data exfiltration.
The discovery and investigation of the attack reveals three critical insights:
  1. Social media offers a powerful and hidden route to target key government and industry leadership through an external base possibly outside of existing security measures.
  2. With reference to targeting associated with this campaign it is possible that Iranian hackers used accesses gained through these activities to support the development of weapon systems, reveal the disposition of the US military or the US alliance with Israel or give an advantage in negotiations between Iran and the US. Furthermore it is possible that any access or knowledge could be used as reconnaissance-for-attack before disruptive or destructive activities
  3. These adversaries are improving in finding and exploiting opportunities to carry out cyber espionage, even if they lacked sophisticated capability.  NEWSCASTER’s success is largely due to patience, brazen nature and innovative use of multiple social media platforms.

    It seems that the NEWSCASTER network targets mainly senior military and policymakers, companies associated with defense technology and the US-Israel lobby, however there are also victims in the financial and energy sectors as well as elsewhere and only a part of the accounts connected to this network were seen. Organizations involved in critical infrastructure or have information that may be of strategic or tactical interest to a nation-state adversary should be concerned about a threat such as this.