Wednesday, June 10, 2015

Duqu 2.0: ‘Almost Invisible’ Cyber Espionage Tool Targeted Russian Co., Linked to Iran Nuclear Talks

 

A Russian cyber security company says that it has discovered a highly-technical, “almost invisible” cyber espionage tool that targeted the company’s own servers and other systems around the world, including some linked to the controversial Iranian nuclear negotiations.
Kaspersky Labs which is based in Moscow announced that the discovery of the worm, called Duqu 2.0, which the company said it found this spring after the worm had penetrated through its system for “months.”



Kaspersky claims that after discovering the worm, started its investigation to find out other victims of the attack and found that some of the “infections are linked to the P5+1 events and venues related to negotiations with Iran about a nuclear deal.”
The Wall Street Journal was the first news agency to publish the news about Duqu 2.0. According to the Wall Street, computers at three luxury European hotels where negotiations had been held were among the worm’s victims.

Eugene Kaspersky said that the company cannot say definitely who is behind the attack, but he believes that due to its sophistication and technical links to previous next-generation computer worms, the attack is most possibly been carried out by a government.

Kaspersky said that the name of the Duqu 2.0 was chosen for this worm because it appeared to be an upgraded version of the Duqu worm which was another highly-sophisticated espionage tool discovered in 2011.
Kaspersky said, We can’t prove attribution because they’re going through proxy servers. “There are technical attributions we can read from the code. This attack is a relative, it’s a new generation of the Duqu attack, most probably made by the same people, or they shared the source code with others.”
Symantec which is a large cyber security company in America agreed that Duqu 2.0 is a evolution of the original threat that was created by the same group of attackers.



Symantec also reported Duqu 2.0 appears to have targeted European and North African telecom operators and a South East Asian electronic equipment manufacturer. Symantec had reported in 2012 that the Duqu threat had not been eliminated and that a new version of the worm had been discovered then.

Duqu and Duqu 2.0 is closely linked to Stuxnet, which is a revolutionary cyber-weapon that was believed to have physically damaged an Iranian nuclear facility and that was suspected to be a result of the joint US-Israeli top secret operation’s. 

 

When the original Duqu was discovered in 2011, Symantec reported that it “shares large number of codes with Stuxnet” and the same suspicions were raise about whether the attackers were the same or if source code had been shared.

Wall Street Journal in its report today said that Duqu 2.0 was “commonly believed to be used by Israeli spies.”
But according to Kaspersky Labs, Duqu 2.0 code also included a number of “false flag” clues to hide/mislead who was behind it. One was a mention in the code of a nickname for a Chinese military officer who was one of five indicted by the U.S. in an extraordinary move by the Department of Justice against Chinese cyber espionage. Another report mentioned a prolific Romanian hacker.

Kaspersky claims that such false flags are relatively easy to spot, especially when the attacker is very careful not to make any other mistakes,”

Thursday, May 14, 2015

Iran’s Cyberarmy: Is “Norse Company” as good as they think they are?



A report has been recently issued regarding Iran’s possible plans to carry out cyber attacks in USA. This report is really surprising not only because of the shocking claims but also the identity of the reporters. A Silicon Valley cyber security Company and a Washington think tank which has been one of the strong oppositions of the nuclear deal with Iran had issued this report. The report warns that if US removed the sanctions against Iran, the Iranian government will use the money to strengthen its Cyber warfare program.

However, it is interesting to know that before publication of the report, the Silicon Valley cyber security company has been sharing his information about Iran’s cyber warfare with US intelligence organisations. According to some US government officials, the information provided by the security company received negative reactions from the US officials that were trying to reach nuclear deal with Iran.



Based on this report, which was written by the cyber security company Norse in January of this year, Norse company claimed that it had data on “more than 500,000 attacks on Industrial Control systems over the last 24 months” referring to the computers that help to run electricity generation companies, hydroelectric facilities, and other critical infrastructure in the U.S.

Norse’s claim of half a million “attacks” is a very large number and they haven’t explained or shown any evidence in the document to prove their claim. They have just mentioned that more details are forthcoming in a report that the company will publish “later this year.” The bulletin also claims that Iran is targeting computer systems and Web sites inside the United States.

It seems that Norse company’s conclusions were based on the idea that Iran was behind malicious cyber activity just because the traffic was emanating from particular Internet protocol addresses located in Iran. But hackers routinely use IP addresses outside their own country to hide their true location.
Iranian cyber attacks against U.S. are not new: the cyber attack on the Sands casino company destroyed some of the company’s information assets and Iran was behind an attack on U.S. bank websites in 2012. However, the Norse document was making some of the most possible serious claims in cyber security accusing Iran as a country hostile to the U.S. targeting industrial control systems. 

 

Later, Norse appeared to remove its findings when its joint report was published in April and the claim of 500,000 attacks is nowhere to be found in that document. The findings also says that Iran specifically targeted Industrial Control Systems (ICS) in the United States 47 times during 2014. Yet again, the final report also doesn’t include that statement.
This report was intended to present a strategic view of Iran’s capabilities in cyberspace—which many U.S. officials have described as growing and dangerous and not to provide evidence for the U.S. to carry out some retaliatory action before any crime has taken place.
Kurt Stammberger, who is a senior deputy managing director at Norse, defended the report by saying that “briefing summaries [such as the bulletin] make theories that sometimes, at the end of the day, aren’t produced by the data”.

Norse’s critics say that it isn’t definitive enough to say that Iran was certainly trying to target industrial control systems. And it could make Iran look like more of a threat than it might actually be.

Even some of Norse’s critics have said that their ability to collect huge amounts of technical data is impressive and important. Although we don’t deny the company’s expertise but they are clearly not an expert on Iran.